31 outubro 2014

"Dr. Maçães ou: Como Aprendi a Deixar de me Preocupar e a Amar o TTIP"

Já sabíamos que o Secretário de Estado Bruno Maçães gosta muito do TTIP. Ficámos a saber que a deputada Francisca Almeida também gosta muito do TTIP. O primeiro até assina cartas onde exige a inclusão de mecanismos de resolução de litígios investidor-Estado no TTIP. A segunda faz de Dr. Pangloss. Venha o TTIP! Venha rapidamente! Porque TODA a gente concorda com o acordo e, se não concorda, é porque não leu o estudo do CEPR (não é EPR, Exmª. Dr.ª Francisca Almeida), essa ínclita instituição.

Pois, mas há quem tenha lido. E há quem tenha opiniões diferentes, baseadas em modelos com pressupostos diferentes, mais modestos e mais rigorosos. Quando se fazem estudos de impacto macroeconómico, convém que a econometria seja decente (e eu não percebo nada de econometria, mas consigo ver que alguém percebe. Basta que me explique qual o modelo e como o usa).

Vide http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/14-03CapaldoTTIP.pdf

O mais importante, para começar, é isto:
Quantitative arguments in favor of TTIP come mostly from four widely cited econometric studies: Ecorys (2009), CEPR (2013), CEPII (2013) and Bertelsmann Stiftung (2013). (...) (p.5)
Methodologically, the similarities among the four studies are striking. While all use World Bank-style Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, the first two studies also use exactly the same CGE. The specific CGE they use is called the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), developed by researchers at Purdue University. All but Bertelsmann use a version of the same database (again from GTAP). The limitations of CGE models as tools for assessments of trade reforms emerged during the liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s . The main problem with these models is their assumption on the process leading to a new macroeconomic equilibrium after trade is liberalized. (...) (p.6)

Moreover, most CGEs rely on misleading assumptions on the pattern of international trade, imposing a fixed structure on the market share that each country has in its export markets10, and on a static analysis that does not explain how economies reach a new equilibrium. For example, when Country A expands trade with Country B, the rest of the world's economies do not simply stand still. Countries C, D and E will find that they are more or less competitive in these markets as a result of the A-and-B trade changes. This effect is known as "trade diversion", and has been a significant by-product of recent trade integration initiatives. Finally, the strategy chosen to simulate a “TTIP future” has a strong impact on the results. Ecorys assumes that so-called "Non-Trade Barriers" impose a given cost on trade and that TTIP can remove up to one half of them. CEPR and CEPII borrow this approach, but assume a lower share . These barriers can include what other stakeholders refer to as consumer and environmental regulations. Phasing them out may be difficult and could impose important adjustment costs not captured by the models. (...) (pp. 6-7) 
A alternativa (é que há sempre alternativas, Thatcher)?

To obtain a more realistic TTIP scenario, we need to move beyond CGE models. A convenient alternative is provided by the United Nations Global Policy Model (GPM), which informs influential publications such as the Trade and Development Report. The GPM is a demand-driven, global econometric model that relies on a dataset of consistent macroeconomic data for every country.
Algumas citações giras deste estudo:
We project that TTIP will lead to a contraction of GDP, personal incomes and employment. We also project an increase in financial instability and a continuing downward trend in the labor share of GDP. (p.1)
 TTIP would lead to a reduction of the labor share (the share of total income accruing to workers), reinforcing a trend that has contributed to the current stagnation. The flipside of its projected decrease is an increase in the share of profits and rents, indicating that proportionally there would be a transfer of income from labor to capital. The largest transfers will take place in UK (7% of GDP transferred from labor to profit income), France (8%), Germany and Northern Europe (4%). (p.2)
We draw two general conclusions. First, as suggested in recent literature, existing assessments of TTIP do not offer a suitable basis for important trade reforms. Indeed, when a more realistic model is used, results change dramatically. Second, seeking a higher trade volume is not a sustainable growth strategy for the EU. In the current context of austerity, high unemployment and low growth, increasing the pressure on labor incomes would further harm economic activity. Our results suggest that any viable strategy to rekindle economic growth in Europe would have to build on a strong policy effort in support of labor incomes. (p.3)
Uma tabela particularmente reveladora:


Não tenho tempo para traduzir isto, por agora. Mas os números falam por si. 583 000 empregos a menos em 2025, sem contar com o emprego ultra-precário, com as assimetrias de género e com as consequências ambientais.

O TTIP é isto. É preciso lutar contra esta ameaça.


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