Varoufakis vai ao quarto 101

“The Greek government has gone, not the extra mile, the extra ten miles and now we're expecting our partners to meet us... not halfway, but one fifth of the way,” - Yanis Varoufakis, hoje.

Infelizmente, terá de ser o governo grego a fazer o último quinto. E a enfrentar um processo que se afigura complicado - interna e externamente.

Apesar de todas as afirmações inacreditáveis do aparato mediático português, que se depõe aos pés do Eurogrupo e ameaça tirar o açaime para morder o pescoço de Tsipras e Varoufakis, a realidade continua, teimosamente, a contar outras histórias.

Do Macropolis:

Commitment, though, is a two-way street and Greece would be within its rights to accuse its eurozone partners of failing to live up to their commitments to Athens. On November 27 2012, the Eurogroup agreed to provide further debt relief to Greece once it achieved a primary surplus. 

The relevant extract from the common statement on that day reads: “States will consider further measures and assistance, including inter alia lower co-financing in structural funds and/or further interest rate reduction of the Greek Loan Facility, if necessary, for achieving a further credible and sustainable reduction of Greek debt-to-GDP ratio, when Greece reaches an annual primary surplus, as envisaged in the current MoU, conditional on full implementation of all conditions contained in the programme.” 

Despite this commitment and even though Greece achieved a primary surplus in 2013, a year ahead of schedule, no measures on further debt relief were offered. The previous government was told at the end of 2013 to wait until the primary surplus was rubber stamped by Eurostat in March. Then, it was told to wait until after the European Parliament elections in May. Then, it was told to wait until after the completion of the troika review that began last September. Greece’s lenders attempted to cover their reluctance with the fig leaf of claims that Greek debt was on a sustainable path.

Vale a pena ler o texto na sua totalidade. É equilibrado e evita chavões. Um intervalo merecido (inclusivé da tralha que vou enfiando aqui).

A confiabilidade da troika, perdão, das instituições já foi amplamente debatida. O problema dos multiplicadores fiscais, que o próprio FMI abordou, não parece ter servido para melhorar a qualidade do debate. Portanto, a culpa "dos gregos" há-de ser a incapacidade de proceder a reformas estruturais.

Errado, de acordo com a OCDE (tirado daqui, relatório completo aqui):

Nos comentários, uma intervenção interessante de Frances Coppola, que sugere uma justificação possível para o foco no combate à corrupção, à evasão fiscal e às oligarquias:

The "shrink-the-state" mob assume that there is a well-functioning private sector ready and able to rush into the space left by drastic cuts in public functions. In much of Southern Europe, for historic reasons, that's not the case. Greece's private sector is very weak and dominated by vested interests. Troika-imposed tax hikes have not helped matters: the rich who can avoid taxes do so as they always have done, because Greek authorities lack the will or the power to address this, so the taxes fall on small businesses and ordinary households, causing bankruptcies and deeply depressing domestic demand. Tony Yates argued recently that there was no point in privatisations if the assets were simply going to be bought by oligarchs. Greece needs radical reform and strengthening of institutions so that its private sector can develop, not tax hikes and spending cuts that force it to contract.

O que tudo isto nos diz é relativamente simples. A economia política da austeridade acaba por não retirar fricções ao mercado e pode introduzir mais distorções que as previamente existentes; ao invés, exerce um efeito cumulativo de destruição da capacidade produtiva instalada e potencial. Nada disto é novo e já devíamos ter passado à frente. Mas o mundo parou com a invenção da austeridade expansionária e é mantido em suspensão por quem tem uma inconfessada paixão pelos sacrifícios rituais. Já alguém o disse, e isto merece ser repetido: para compreendermos como funcionam estes grupos e como perduram estes argumentos, não precisamos de economistas, mas de teólogos e sociólogos da religião.